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Abstract

This essay tries to understand a particular pattern of the relation between social movement and political party. By analyzing the development of the anti-nuclear protest in Taiwan, the author puts forth the concept of party-dependent movement. This term denotes an awkward situation where the fate of a social movement is bound to the electoral performance of a certain political party. In Taiwan, the rise of anti-nuclear voice is closely related to the democratic opening. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) adopted an unequivocal anti-nuclear stand ever since its founding in 1986, thus helped to collect the increasing support from the broad movement constituents. But the growing DPP has other political priorities, which means the anti-nuclear goal is often shelved to the disappointment of movement activists. As a consequence of the early convergence, the movement has not been able to re-assert its autonomy.

Introduction

The year two thousand witnessed the first democratic power turnover in Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian, with his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won a highly competitive presidential election, thus ending over fifty years of rule by the Kuomintang (KMT). With Chen’s assumption of power, a new era of progressive reform is expected to

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set in. Chen and his DPP have long been advocating the termination of an entrenched corruption structure. The KMT took the credit for fostering economic growth in Taiwan from the very beginning and, more recently, for remarkably piloting Taiwan safely out of the Asian financial crisis. Still, the KMT’s fall was largely attributed to the increasing discontent with its dubious political integrity. People were gradually less tolerant of the KMT’s cronism with big businesspersons, local factions, and even organized gangsters. Here, with the coming of the DPP government, democratic consolidation meets the issue of social reform.

Among the DPP’s proposed reform agenda, nuclear energy stands high in priority. Ever since its founding in 1986, the DPP took a clear stand on this issue. In the original party charter, the new opposition party vowed to challenge the KMT’s pro-nuclear stance. In the millennial election campaign, Chen re-confirmed this policy stand and proposed ‘to promote the research and development of renewable and new energy technology and to stop using nuclear energy.’ Roughly within the same time span, the anti-nuclear movement in Taiwan continued to grow and gathered new momentum. Beginning with some dissenting scientists in the late 1970s, the nuclear skepticism has spread to local residents near nuclear facilities and to the urban middle class. Together they make up the main force of Taiwanese anti-nuclear protests. And they are most insistent on seeing Chen implement his anti-nuclear reforms, including halting the construction of the island’s fourth nuclear power plant and decommissioning the first three plants earlier than previously scheduled.

But the ensuing scenario turned out quite unexpectedly. Four months after Chen’s installation as president, the DPP government announced its intent to abolish the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant in October 2000. This bold policy switch was made after initial hesitations and vague gestures. But this ill-timed announcement immediately backfired and encouraged the opposition bloc, the KMT, the New Party, and the newly-formed People First Party, to wage an all-out offensive on the government. Owing to their absolute majority in parliament,2 the DPP had to step back in order not to aggravate or perpetuate the constitutional crisis. In February 2001, the DPP government revised its previous decision and continued to

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1 Chen Shui-bian Presidential Campaign Coordinating Center, New Age, and New Solution: Chen Shui-bian’s Blueprint for Government (February 2000), vol. 4, p. 4.
2 The DPP has only 60-odd seats in the Legislative Yuan. It is even less than the one-third of the total 225 seats.
build the controversial plant so as to seek political reconciliation. The long awaited anti-nuclear reform came to an end without any achievement except for some vague promises from the government. Naturally, those who had fought for a nuclear-free Taiwan for more than a decade were severely disappointed. Some still believed in the DPP's sincerity to carry out reform promises and sympathetically understood the necessity for political peace, though not endorsing this strategical withdrawal whole-heartedly. There were other activists who took a dim view of the DPP's commitment, and they began to characterize President Chen as 'traitor'.

In this essay, we are not going to deal with the political maneuvering and contestations between the DPP and its opponents. We are more concerned about why the fate of a social movement became bound with party politics. A key to understanding the debacle of anti-nuclear reform lies in the past history of the movement itself. What made the anti-nuclear movement such an easy captive for the DPP? The pattern of asymmetric alliance has long been observable between the DPP and anti-nuclear forces. Protesters need the DPP's political might to promote nuclear-free issues, and the politicians need new ballots coming from social mobilization. Over time, this symbiotic relationship gave way to dependence in the classical sense: The DPP grew more autonomous from its anti-nuclear supporters once it had accumulated enough political resources. Here, we put forward a historical account of the development of the anti-nuclear movement in Taiwan and try to locate the underlying factors. But before we engage in the actual analysis, we shall discuss on the peculiar aspect of the Taiwanese anti-nuclear movement, especially in the light of western experience.

**The Anti-Nuclear Movement and Liberal Democracy: The Peculiarity of Taiwan**

In the West, it is often asserted that the environmental movement resulted from a new type of awareness that valued natural harmony over economic growth. Theories of 'post-materialism'\(^4\) or 'new envi-

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ontamental paradigm\textsuperscript{5} tried to describe this shift of social values. They asserted that the new middle class, satisfied in material needs, turned to more spiritual and non-economical pursuits and began to criticize the idea of unlimited growth. The environmental protests, therefore, came after material prosperity. Such temporal sequence can also be found in Taiwan. It is observed that the rapid industrialization in Taiwan both paid a huge environmental cost and spurred the popular action to protect the damage done to nature.\textsuperscript{6}

But the similarity cannot be overextended. In the European context, Peter Wagner has suggested that the rise of the anti-nuclear movement 'decreased electoral stability and weakened mass support for a coalition for economic growth formed by the major established political parties, all of which had also adhere to some sort of Keynesian welfare consensus.'\textsuperscript{7} In the initial period of its anti-nuclear movement, Taiwan was under the firm rule of authoritarianism and the pro-growth outlook, though a reality in policy orientation, was never an established consensus. In sum, what the first generation of Taiwanese anti-nuclear activists faced was not a capitalism tamed by democracy, but rather a rampant capitalism without democratic accountability. Their western counterparts protested against the major parties, which were too committed to the goal of growth with advanced technology to be responsive to the increasing nuclear skepticism. In Taiwan, however, as the senile authoritarianism was under pressure to liberalize, the environmental activists found some rising political elites in opposition willing to accept new ideas. Therefore, in the democratic transition following the lifting of martial law in 1987, the battle lines between anti- and pro-nuclear forces became consolidated along the cleavage of partisan identity. Here, the nuclear energy issue complemented rather than undermined the pattern of party politics.

It is not possible to over-emphasize the importance of the timing. The anti-nuclear movement in Taiwan encountered the harsh reality


of authoritarian rule, while that in the West developed within the framework of liberal democracy. Environmentalism, feminism, and a host of previously marginal issues have been termed ‘new politics.’ Commenting on their mobilizing style and ingrained distrust of the establishment, Claus Offe said their ‘persistence testified to the limited and perhaps shrinking absorption and political processing capacity of established political actors and the procedures of “normal politics,” as well as of institutions within civil society.’ The inertia of democratic arrangement has excluded the environmentalists from entering the traditional political arena, who in turn cultivated an unconventional style of doing politics. Therefore, the development of western environmentalism contributed to weakening of the aged left–right cleavage and the main activists of risk politics interpreted themselves as ‘beyond left and right,’ viewing socialism and capitalism both as foes, as Anthony Giddens put it.

Reflecting on the western experience, Alessandro Pizzorno asked a rhetorical question. ‘Why should an already represented citizen join collective action to obtain a law on abortion? If this is a new issue, why does it emerge from outside the existing channels of representation?’ Apparently, this question is out of place in the context of Taiwan. Around mid-1980s, a Taiwanese citizen was not politically represented. If she/he wanted clear energy free of nuclear risk, the collective action easily took a political connotation. The simultaneous coincidence of anti-nuclear protests and political opposition provided a totally different set of political opportunities.

The formation of opposition presented the activists with a ready-made political ally, but their growing involvement also precluded other possible forms of political alliance. By taking up the anti-nuclear position, the DPP instilled a new idea into its supporters and converted them into followers of environmentalism. But this also had the danger of ghettoizing the anti-nuclear movement and potentially preventing its acceptance by non-DPP voters.

Secondly, the involvement of external political force in a nascent protest issue also alleviated the startup dilemma of collective action.

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Social movements, as Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) stressed, are processes of rationally collecting and planning resources in pursuit of certain specific goals. On the other hand, those who take up protests are often people without resources. It is their marginal social status that compels them to resort to protest. Hence, social movement is done by the powerless in an attempt to regain power. But how resource-poor people can gather enough resources to launch a protest becomes the initial difficulty. Here, RMT researchers came up with a short-cut solution. As Gary Marx and James Wood argued, the RMT ‘set themselves off from the classic . . . model of mobilizing a movement, where money, manpower, and leadership come from the base of the movement—i.e. from the masses.’

External elite sponsorship lessened the dire deprivation of indigenous resources and lowered the threshold of initial mobilization. Seen in this light, we can understand why the DPP politicians were then welcome in the movement circle. Being an organized political entity, the DPP was far superior in terms of its political influence, financial resources, and media visibility. Besides, the movement itself needed a political advocate to alter the state-endorsed nuclear energy project. It was this early-push factor that drew anti-nuclear movement closer to political opposition and paved the way for the latter one-sided dependent relationship.

In summary, the lack of liberal democracy coupled with the emergence of new political opposition was the structural factor that endeared the DPP and anti-nuclear movement to each other. This also accounts for the peculiar development of the Taiwanese environmental movement, demarcating itself from its western counterpart. But the actual trajectory was more complicated and crooked. In the following sections, we shall divide the whole process into several phases.

The Nuclear Energy Debate (1979–1986): A Gentlemen’s Disagreement?

In the early stage of the Taiwanese anti-nuclear movement, the academics were the first pioneers. Owing to their professional know-

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ledge and greater exposure to international news, particularly the Three Mile Island Incident in 1979, they began to question the state-promoted nuclear energy projects. By that time, the first nuclear power plant was already commercially operated while the other two were still under construction. That year, Edgar Lin (Lin Jun-yi), professor of biology at Tunghai University, published an article in China Magazine (Chung Hua Tsa Chih). Lin severely criticized the authorities for their lack of concern for ecology, safety, and the problem of nuclear waste disposal. It did not take very long before an equally sharp-worded reply from a nuclear engineer of Tai-Power company came out. This was the first nuclear debate in Taiwan. Since this event, more and more scholars and experts began to voice their disagreements. According to a survey, 197 articles with anti-nuclear themes were published in Taiwanese magazines between 1979 and 1986. Their distribution is shown in Table 1.

As can be seen in Table 1, there is a clearly observable trend of increasing scholarly attention to the nuclear issue. Apparently, international nuclear criticism, as well as the repeated exposures of bad management of the authorities in Taiwan, aroused some intellectuals’ suspicions. Most of these articles were written by academics and their style tended to be professionally oriented, full of expertise and jargon. To sustain their argument, they usually referred to foreign experiences and the latest research results. As Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and Robert Weller pointed out, these first campaigners of ‘green’ ideas were often U.S.-trained scientists and proud of their professional backgrounds. In this aspect, they were not dissimilar to their opponents, for both the nuclear engineers and planning bureaucrats relied on highly scientific languages. Therefore their debates, though merciless in tone, were largely inaccessible to the layperson, at least in the early stage.

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Note: In this table, we discount the articles which appeared in tangwai magazines. We shall come to this point later.

Another dimension is also noteworthy. Most of the anti-nuclear authors tended to avoid sensitive political overtones, cautiously framing their writings as professional discussion. Keeping a low profile about politics was certainly the trained inclination of some experts. But the low-key strategy also reflected the unfavorable political atmosphere. Edgar Lin, the acknowledged ‘father’ of the Taiwanese anti-nuclear movement, told the author about one particular incident in which one of his early anti-nuclear articles resulted in the banning of the publication magazine. He tried to circumvent domestic censorship by contributing to an international journal to protest against the KMT’s nuclear power project.

Academics might shun political criticism, but such was not the case of tangwai. The tangwai, literally ‘nonpartisan,’ referred to the political opposition before they formed the DPP in 1986. In their electoral challenge to the KMT, the tangwai tried to assimilate every kind of social discontent in order to build up a more comprehensive opposition bloc. Underdogs, discriminated against by the authoritarian regime, such as distressed farmers, laid-off workers, and pollution victims, gradually came to their attention, though the actual organizing work did not fully launch until a wave of social protests in late 1980s. Here, the nuclear issue served many purposes. First, it was long rumored that the building of nuclear power plants was politically corrupt and involved huge kickbacks and commissions. To expose these irregularities was naturally to debunk the KMT’s legitimacy. Secondly, the nuclear risk is extreme, in spite of the official story to the contrary. Alerting people to the potential nuclear threat helped to cultivate a distrustful attitude in regard to the KMT’s propaganda, thus increasing the scope of the tangwai’s social support. Last but not least, by taking up the anti-nuclear alternative, the tangwai could broaden its policy claims and deliver a new message for the voters in general.

Therefore, together with the rising public opinion against nuclear energy, the tangwai began to publish anti-nuclear articles in their magazines. We have gathered these writings from ten tangwai magazines. Table 2 shows the distribution of these articles starting in 1981.

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14 This is based on an interview with Professor Edgar Lin, May 20, 1999.
The tangwai magazines at that time served as the important mouthpiece for the opposition since the major mass media was under heavy surveillance of the KMT regime. With these independent channels, the tangwai could voice their political demands and even cover the news that could not escape the KMT’s censorship. Needless to say, these anti-nuclear writings tended to focus on the political aspect. In addition to the enormous risk, the tangwai questioned the democratic deficit in the nuclear policy-making and the hushed-up relation with nuclear weapons that was secretly developed at that time. Here, the tangwai stood at the opposite extreme from those scholars who tended to slight the political questions. In fact, the nuclear issue was of such consequence to the tangwai that in the same sampled magazines, we found 167 articles dealing with the environmental problems of the time, of which 72 carried anti-nuclear themes. This indicated that the opposition displayed a great interest in this issue. To be sure, the nuclear problems were more readily politicized than other environmental ones, such as soil erosion, industrial pollution, or waste disposal.

Seen in hindsight, the nuclear issue of the mid-1980s was not yet partisan. Alongside scholars and the tangwai, a number of young KMT politicians were also sympathetic to the anti-nuclear voices. Beginning around 1985, some KMT Legislators, Lin Yu-hsiang, Lin Lien-hui, Chao Shao-kang, and Jao Yin-chi, for example, have publicly expressed their opinions in direct opposition to the authorities.\(^{17}\) Basically, they were in tune with the current growing skepticism about nuclear energy. The key issue at the time was whether or not to build a fourth nuclear power plant. At that time, several minor nuclear accidents had occurred because of the negligence of the Tai-power Company. In addition, there was strong criticism surrounding the lack of financial control over the third nuclear power plant. The original budget was estimated at 35.7 billion NT dollars, roughly 0.89 billion U.S. dollars. But the later supplementary budget had swollen to 97.4 billion NT dollars, or 2.37 billion U.S. dollars. Even

\(^{17}\) See their writings in *Independent Evening Post*, May 5–21, 1986, p. 3.
a top governmental official viewed this bloated budget addition as ‘preposterous.’

Meanwhile, several large-scale of public debates were held as the government was evaluating the feasibility of a new nuclear power plant. There was even a television-broadcast debate on this controversy, which previously would have been unthinkable. As Professor Chang Kuo-lung of the National Taiwan University (an anti-nuclear veteran) later recalled, the Tai-power engineers had long been self-content with their professional knowledge while overlooking other criticism, so they performed poorly in these public debates.

The last straw for the camel came from the Legislative Yuan. In April 1985, 55 KMT legislators and 6 tangwai legislators separately signed appeals to suspend the construction of the new nuclear power plant. One month later, Premier Yu Kuo-hua shelved the thorny issue by decreeing that ‘the fourth nuclear power plant was in no hurry to build.’ Yu’s compromise did not spell an unequivocal victory for the anti-nuclear camp. The Tai-power company never suspended construction work at the designated site in Kongliao ever since it had purchased the land in 1983. The news media even claimed that a fifth power plant proposal has been approved in secret. At best, Yu’s decision was a temporary cease-fire, which paved the way for the next round of contests.


In the previous stage, the main anti-nuclear participants were academics, KMT politicians and the tangwai. Those directly affected

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18 See the comment of Director of Council for Economic Planning and Development, Chao Yao-tung, in Independent Evening Post, March 20, 1985, p. 2.
19 See China Times, April 12, 1995, p. 3.
20 Based on an interview with Chang Kuo-lung, January 30, 1999.
23 It should be noted that the anti-nuclear protests in Taiwan involved issues other than the nuclear power plant. Nuclear waste facilities and radioactivity-contaminated houses also alerted different people to the nuclear danger. But, in this essay, we narrow our analysis to the protest in Kongliao, which is the only sustained anti-nuclear movement case over years.
were mysteriously absent from the controversy. Their silence did not, however, mean whole-hearted acceptance of nuclear power. The Tai-power’s land purchase, site clearance, and a nuclear threat on the horizon weighed gravely on the minds of Kungliao fishermen. In fact, before the lifting of martial law in July 1987, there arose a great wave of grassroots protests against industrial pollution elsewhere in Taiwan. Those victimized grassroots had been the vanguards for the young environmental movement. Compared with other pollution issues, nuclear power was more intellectually demanding; beyond the local fishermen’s understanding. Thus, though they held the proposed power plant under suspicion, local organized resistance did not begin until 1988.

In the meantime, anti-nuclear scholars began to change tactics. No longer satisfied with professional debates and article writing, these intellectuals tried more daring gestures. In October 1986, some academics with the younger generation of the tangwai staged the first protest at the Tai-power Company headquarters in Taipei. In March and April of the following year, three public speeches were organized in Taipei, Hengchuen (where the third nuclear power plant was located), and Kungliao. In retrospect, these moves signified the role change on the part of scholars, for they began to work with the political opposition and to challenge the authorities overtly. Put in the contemporary context, this change also mirrored the overall rebellious zeitgeist of civil society, which was beginning to witness protests over many issues. Professor Chang Kuo-lung confirmed this point. The newly emergent anti-pollution protests, especially the Dupont case in central Taiwan (1986–1987), convinced him of the need ‘to integrate the grassroots and the knowledge.

24 See some early complaints from the fishermen, Independent Evening Post, January 31, 1985, p. 1. The author is thankful for Professor Michael Mau-Kuei Chang’s advice on this point.


26 For the chronicle of the anti-nuclear movement in Taiwan, see Notes of Humanist Education (Jen Pen Chiao Yu Cha Chi) 138 (December 2000), pp. 68–80.

27 For the anti-Dupont movement, see James Reardon-Anderson, Pollution, Politics, and Foreign Investment in Taiwan: The Lukang Rebellion (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992).

28 Based on an interview with Chang Kuo-lung, January 30, 1999.
This radical strategy worked. The public anti-nuclear speech staged in Kongliao exerted tremendous influence on the local fishermen. The academics’ participation had the effect of justifying their doubts and encouraged them to take organized action. One local leader retold that these professors ‘made contact with us, gave us theoretical basis for protest, and consequently our movement is more legitimated’.29 Thus, the local-led Yenliao Anti-Nuclear Self-Defense Association (SDA for short; Fan He Tzu Chii Hui) was formed in March 1988 and there started an over-13-year-long march to combat the power plant.

While scholars were bringing the anti-nuclear message to local society, the tangwai came along. Early anti-nuclear academics, Edgar Lin, Chang Kuo-lung and Huang Ti-Yuan of Tsing Hua University, all held sympathy for the democratic movement and maintained good personal relations with some opposition leaders. Both Lin and Chang later joined the DPP and were active in politics. Huang was even invited to the ‘clandestine’ founding congress of the DPP in September 1986.30 For this reason, some tangwai politicians were also guest speakers at a public speech in Kongliao, and this helped the opposition to build a beachhead here. Yu Chin, then a star tangwai member and later Magistrate of Taipei County (1990–1997), made his initial contact with Kongliao fishermen through the nuclear issue. By taking up the anti-nuclear cause, Yu was able to score major landslide victories in Kongiao in the following elections.

On the other hand, as the tangwai was reorganizing itself into the DPP, an anti-nuclear policy stand grew more visible. The DPP’s original party charter of 1986 pledged not to build new nuclear power plants and to exercise more stringent surveillance over the existing ones. In the parliamentary election in that year, one of the sixteen common political views stated, ‘reject any new addition of nuclear power plant; protection of environment and consumers’ rights should take priority in considering economic development.’31 Evidence showed that the opposition elite unanimously agreed on this point. One of the charter framers told the author that there were some arguments concerning the more ‘leftist’ proposals, such as the cause of industrial democracy, which some thought might

29 Taiwan’s Environment (Tai Wan Hwan Chin) 58, April 30, 1993, p. 19.
30 Based on an interview with Huang Ti-Yuan, April 20, 1999.
alienate small businessperson supporters. But on the issue of nuclear energy, all major factions concurred, for none of them had confidence in the KMT’s faulty nuclear management.\(^\text{32}\)

The DPP’s growing interest in environmental problems was not difficult to comprehend. Each new protest event generated anti-KMT sentiment and created windfall gains for the DPP. One active DPP leader commented frankly: ‘In the past, we could mobilize people only by political issues. Now, we could do the same things by environmental issues.’\(^\text{33}\) On the other hand, the newly born DPP was simply too juvenile to think over the energy policy in Taiwan seriously. During the mid-1980s, the DPP leaders were too practical to dream of beating the KMT in the near elections and taking the political power. Therefore, endorsing the non-nuclear cause did not necessarily mean a pro-environment commitment on the part of opposition leaders. But it is still an overstatement to impute a well-calculated Machiavellian motive to the DPP’s founding elites. At least among the New Tide faction, the aims of political democratization and social reforms were taken equally. For these political mavericks, ‘mass action’ should not be subsumed under election campaigning. Therefore, the anti-nuclear cause was both a goal in itself and an instrument to challenge the KMT’s authority.

Once the DPP was formed, a Department of Social Movements was quickly set up with the purpose of launching its own political demonstrations and maintaining liaisons with other movement organizations. The Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU), an umbrella organization created mainly by anti-nuclear scholars in November 1987, collaborated closely with the DPP, especially the New Tide faction, in many protest issues. In fact, some DPP politicians were also TEPU members and not a few local branches were managed directly by them. In some places, the DPP politicians’ offices and local TEPU branches shared the same floor and even were staffed by the same workers. With the DPP’s sponsorship, the TEPU’s resource deficiency was partially relieved. The Yenliao SDA was entirely grassroots-managed. But, being a branch member of the TEPU, it also established another layer of connection with the DPP.

One month after the Yenliao SDA was instituted, the TEPU held a large-scale anti-nuclear rally in Taipei. This was the beginning

\(^{32}\) This is based on an interview with He Tuan-fan, June 25, 1999.

\(^{33}\) Cited from an interview with Tien Chiu-chin, June 4, 1999.
of a tradition of annual anti-nuclear demonstrations. To present a powerful visual image to the public as well as to the authorities, the TEPU needed to mobilize as many people as possible. To this end, the TEPU worked closely with officials from the Department of Social Movements and relied on DPP politicians’ resources and mobilization networks to recruit participants across the nation. One anti-nuclear activist pointed out the instrumental role of the DPP in the early anti-nuclear demonstrations. ‘To mobilize people’, she said, ‘We need someone to pay the busing bill. We’ve tried self-financing, but it was not workable’.34

In sum, the DPP’s participation in the anti-nuclear movement clearly grew deeper and deeper from late 1986 on. With their more explicit involvement, the movement itself gathered new momentum quickly and became a powerful challenger to the KMT regime. The influx of resources from the DPP was not a slight factor. Though we do not have exact survey, it can be safely assumed that a large portion of tangwai DPP supporters were persuaded by this cause, thus enlarging the anti-nuclear claim. With these factors, the anti-nuclear movement gradually became the bedfellow of the equally-nascent political opposition, thus sowing the seeds for party dependence in the next phase.


As the new environmental movement gradually gravitated toward the DPP, previous anti-nuclear voices within the KMT camp died down or disappeared completely. For instance, Chao Shao-kang, who became the second director of Environmental Protection Administration (1990–1992), no longer maintained an unequivocal objection to the fourth nuclear power plant as he had done before. Once in office, he sought to advocate a compromise in which the new plant would not be built but the nuclear reactors were to be relocated into the first three plants.35 Chao’s change exemplified the weakened anti-nuclear voices with the KMT. Since they faced an increasing convergence of opposition and the movement, the marginal vote gains gathered from taking an anti-nuclear stand diminished sharply.

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34 Cited from an interview with Chung Shu-chi, May 15, 1999.
35 *China Times*, July 19, 1991, p. 3.
Thus, the relatively non-partisan status of the anti-nuclear movement around mid-1980s evolved into a closer identification with the DPP.

Another reason responsible for decoupling the KMT and the anti-nuclear movement lay in the regime’s policy shift. In May 1990, an ex-military strongman, Hao Po-tsun, assumed the Premiership. He attributed the recent falling economic performance to the unruly protesters, who scared away investors. On the issue of the coming nuclear power plant, he reversed the previous governmental hesitancy and re-opened its budget, suspended since 1985. ‘The fourth nuclear power plant,’ he seriously declared, ‘is one of the indicators how I shall re-establish the public authority and improve the investment environment.’\textsuperscript{36} In keeping with the renewed attempts to push the controversial project, the government adopted a harsher attitude toward civil protests. Three months after Hao’s installation, he asked the policing authorities to list the so-called ‘social movement ruffians’ and to take necessary legal action.\textsuperscript{37}

Hao’s reinvigorated authoritarianism not only effectively eliminated any dissent among KMT politicians, but also presented a stricter and unfavorable political atmosphere for movement activists. In September 1991, the governmental official announced the project had completed the process of environmental impact assessment. The Yenliao SDA immediately launched its protest offensive. At the designated site, they built a barricade and prepared themselves for sustained resistance. Barricading the construction site was then one of the modular protests in the repertoire of the Taiwanese environmental movement. Before Hao’s coming to power, this tactic was in some way countenanced by the authorities. A tragic accident occurred on 13 October, as the police broke its promise not to dismantle the barricade. A violent clash between local fishermen and policemen led to one death and several injuries.\textsuperscript{38} Later, the police’s threat and judicial persecution reigned in Konglia. There were a total of 17 people found guilty, including one life sentence in prison.

Undoubtedly, repression from above further aggravated movement activists’ animosity toward the governing party. This push factor was augmented by the escalating tension between the KMT

\textsuperscript{36} Cited from Wang Li-shin, \textit{Without Regrets: Hau Pei-tsun’s Political Journey (Wu Kuei: Hau Pei Tsun Te Cheng Chih Chih Lu)} (Taipei: Tien Hsia Publisher, 1994), p. 129.


and the DPP. By the end of 1990, the DPP moved further to the stance of Taiwanese independence by adopting the so-called 1007 resolution, which stated to the effect that the sovereignty of Taiwan excluded China. Hao, backed by the backlash of the mainlanders, threatened to crack down on the DPP.39 The enemy of the enemy is a friend, and this simple logic drew the DPP and various movement sectors closer to each other. There was also a noticeable change in movement strategy in early 1990s. Anti-nuclear activists then advocated more intensive and overt cooperation with the opposition. Edgar Lin commented on the authoritarian repression in 1992: ‘Owing to the fear of politics in the past, environmentalists avoided the politicization of ecological movement, i.e., the democratic movement. This is one of the reasons why the ecological and environmental movement in Taiwan cannot expand. In the future 21st century, political movement must go ecological and humanized, while the ecological movement must be politicized. Then the human can have a hopeful future, and Taiwan is no exception.’40

At the same time, as the KMT government intensified its control over civil society, the DPP’s power continued to grow. In the local election at the end of 1989, the DPP took 7 seats of county magistrates, including that of the most populous and strategically important Taipei County. Within its jurisdiction, there were the first two operating nuclear power plants, and also the contentious fourth in Kongliao. Yu Chin was the first DPP Magistrate of Taipei County, and he appointed the anti-nuclear veteran Chang Kuo-lung as his Secretary-in-Chief.

From 1990 on, the Taipei County Government had been the vanguard to counteract KMT’s pro-nuclear policy. It refused to issue construction permits, to change the status of plant land, and a number of licenses that were legally contingent on its review. Yu and Chang also tried to promote public awareness regarding nuclear risk by distributing anti-nuclear videos, re-educating schoolteachers, and sponsoring investigative journeys to Kongliao. Admittedly, given the centralist political framework in Taiwan, these local measures could in no way revise decisions made from above. Nonetheless, an

40 Edgar Lin, ‘Liberal Democracy is the Necessary Condition to Solve the Ecological Crisis (Tzu Yu Ming Chu Shih Chieh Chueh Sheng Tai Wei Chi Te Pi Yao Tiao Chien),’ Independent Evening Post, August 3, 1992, p. 3.
avowedly anti-nuclear local government gave a sustained boost to activists’ morale and enabled them to carry out some movement tactics. One of them was to hold a referendum on the fourth nuclear power plant, which has been an important movement claim since late 1980s. Movement leaders held that the nuclear decision was made by irresponsible technocrats and corrupt KMT brokers, who could not stand democratic scrutiny from below. Thus, once the information was made public and the right to consent was referred back to the people, the nuclear project would collapse like a house of cards. But the KMT government never acknowledged the legal status of the referendum. In this situation, movement activists could not help but turn to the DPP-controlled local governments for assistance. Beginning in 1994, 4 referendums took place (see Table 3).

All four of these referendums successfully generated an anti-nuclear majority, as activists predicted. Though the KMT government tried to downplay their significance, the referendum results were often cited in later movement propaganda and deemed as milestones by many. Yu and Chang’s Taipei County Government held the first two referendums in close collaboration with movement organizations, especially the TEPU and the Yenliao SDA. The next two, in neighboring administrative areas, Taipei City and Ilan County, roughly followed the same pattern.

The DPP’s local government was not only strategic for movement tactics, but also vital for the survival of the movement organizations themselves. As hinted above, environmental organizations in Taiwan often had a chronic dearth of resources. They needed money to staff their offices and to publish pamphlets. Financing these routine activities by membership fees was simply out of the question. In this situation, local governmental subsidies, grants, and projects were important channels of resource input. Of course, the availability of these resources was contingent upon the willingness of local magistrates. Sharing a common anti-nuclear goal facilitated the inflow of

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994.5.22</td>
<td>Kongliao Village, Taipei County</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994.11.27</td>
<td>Taipei County</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996.3.23</td>
<td>Taipei City</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998.12.5</td>
<td>Ilan County</td>
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Source: newspaper sources.
governmental resources. In addition to this, a friendly local government brought administrative conveniences. For example, red tape and other bureaucratic niceties often frustrated registration applications made by movement organizations. For example, the TEPU refused to add a suffix of ‘Republic of China’ into its original title and consequently was denied official recognition repeatedly by the KMT government. Not until Chen Shui-bian became the Mayor of Taipei City in 1995 did the TEPU finally receive the registration as it had wished. Such instances proved to be the instrumental functions of DPP local governments for the anti-nuclear movements.

The growth of the DPP's political might was also reflected in its parliamentary seats. In the first overall re-election of the Legislative Yuan in 1992, the DPP scored a major victory, winning 31% of votes and 50 out of 161 total seats.\(^1\) With this success, the DPP was established as a full-fledged challenger to the KMT. For the anti-nuclear activists, DPP's now entrenched political status could also be of great service for the movement. The Tai-power Company was a state-owned enterprise, whose budget was annually reviewed by the Legislative Yuan. There was a possible scenario that the project of the fourth nuclear power plant might be stopped at this stage.

Upon seeing this possibility, the TEPU launched its parliamentary lobbying offensives. On the one hand, they tried to secure and re-confirm their support for the DPP's politicians. On the other hand, the TEPU activists also reached out to the KMT Legislators, whom they thought might be persuaded of the nuclear risk or the public opinion in their electoral district. Four consecutive years, beginning in 1992, witnessed fierce budgetary battles in the Legislative Yuan. Outside the parliamentary building, thousands of protesters staged sit-ins, hunger strikes, and a host of activities. Much to the activists' disappointment, the voting pattern lined up roughly with the partisan identity: the DPP voted against the budget in a bloc; while only a few KMT Legislators cast invalid votes or votes contrary to the government's wish. The inability to change the KMT Legislators' minds stultified all lobbying efforts. Here, activists encountered the harsh reality of party politics. It was extremely difficult to persuade a non-DPP politician to support the anti-nuclear cause. It became quite apparent that the DPP's endorsement might be an asset as well as a liability. The more seats the DPP occupied, the greater the

\(^1\) Lin Chia-lung, ‘Paths to Democracy: Taiwan in Comparative Perspective,’ Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 1998, p. 365.
possibility that the anti-nuclear camp may win in parliament. But the closer the movement was identified with the DPP, the more difficult it was to find political advocates outside DPP.

Not all of the activists were satisfied with this situation. But the reality was clear: the political fate of the anti-nuclear movement became tightly bound with the electoral success of the DPP. As long as the DPP controlled the Taipei County Government, there was a friendly and helpful ally for the movement.\(^42\) If the DPP gained one more seat in the Legislative Yuan, the odds for the anti-nuclear camp increased by a fraction. In sum, there were push factors and pull factors responsible for this pattern of dependence. The former included the KMT’s crackdown and renewed effort to promote nuclear energy in the early 1990s. The latter had to do with growth of the DPP. On its way to the power, the DPP conquered more elected positions and exerted more political influence. The overall result was the transformation of a more equal symbiosis into a one-sided dependence. Alessandro Pizzorno used the term ‘political exchange’ to describe the relationship between social groups and powerholders.\(^43\) Thus, what we saw here was also an alternating trend of political exchange unfavorable to the anti-nuclear movement. In the next section, we will see a belated effort to resist this trend by movement activists.

**The Effort to Re-assert Movement Autonomy (1996–1999)**

Two critical events in 1996 made impact on the tacit alliance between the DPP and the anti-nuclear movement. One was a travail concerning the bill to abolish all nuclear plants under construction, and the other was the formation of the Taiwan Green Party (TGP). Let us deal the former first.

After the parliamentary election in 1995, the absolute majority of KMT was largely reduced. It then held a thin margin of 3 seats above the half. While the DPP’s gain of 4 seats was below expectations, the

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biggest winner went to a first-timer, the New Party (NP), which scored 21 seats. The NP was a breakaway party from the KMT and championed the mainlanders’ interests. The KMT’s weakened control of the Legislative Yuan brought a new opportunity to re-open the case of the fourth nuclear power plant. The DPP then tried to make overtures to the NP and an ‘anti-KMT strategic alliance’ took shape.\textsuperscript{44} At that time, movement activists successfully obtained conditional promise from the NP to uphold the anti-nuclear cause. In May 1996, as KMT Legislators were facing severe disunion, a bill to terminate all of the nuclear plants under construction was co-proposed by the DPP and the NP. The KMT in strife was unable to prevent the bill from passing three readings.\textsuperscript{45}

Though the anti-nuclear camp won the first round, the constitutional procedures guaranteed the final victory of the KMT. As the constitution of that time stipulated, the Executive Yuan had four months to ask the Legislative Yuan to re-consider the bill, and as long as it could acquire one-third of the Legislators’ approval, the bill would be annulled. The NP then saw little chance of winning and decided to adopt a strategy of passive resistance. Anti-nuclear movement leaders asked the DPP to use all possible parliamentary means to stop the re-consideration. On 18 October 1996, the DPP issued an order of mobilization and its Chairperson joined a sit-in protest outside the Legislative Yuan. Later the same day, anti-nuclear protesters came by one piece of evidence, which proved a secret deal between the KMT and the DPP. The DPP parliamentary leadership had seen no use in all-out resistance and had tacitly traded the nuclear bill for other concessions from the KMT. This startling finding was immediately broadcast over loudspeakers and incited mixed feelings of betrayal and fury among the protesters. Then the crowd vented their anger at the DPP Legislators and a violent clash resulted.\textsuperscript{46}

This unhappy incident exacerbated their already tenuous relations. Later some DPP politicians, using the KMT’s conventional wording, vehemently denounced ‘the anti-nuclear rabble’ and claimed to give all the ‘mass movement’ from now on.\textsuperscript{47} As one member of the news media observed: ‘the DPP, whose rise was attributed to the social movements, fell completely in this mass move-

\textsuperscript{44} Lin Chia-lung, \textit{ibid.}, p. 369.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{China Times}, October 19, 1996, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{United Daily News}, October 22, 1996, p. 3.
ment. From then until now, the DPP's interest in the movement as a whole grew visibly weaker though the DPP as a whole never acknowledged any change in policy orientation. But it is clearly observable that the DPP Legislators were no longer active in sponsoring anti-nuclear proposals as before. For the radical elements in the anti-nuclear camp, the DPP's presence in the annual demonstration was not longer welcome. They often encountered hostile eyebrows or verbal humiliation from the more passionate participants. In the DPP's standing executive committee, it was even proposed not to join the demonstration ever again.

Let us come to the second critical event of 1996. The formation of the Taiwan Green Party was an eleventh-hour attempt to salvage the anti-nuclear movement from DPP dependence. In its founding declaration, the TGP claimed: 'Since social movements opposed the existing establishment, they have cooperated with the political opposition in the past. Now, after the political re-alignment, the opposition made compromise with the status quo in order to become the governing party, thus moving away from the social movement sector . . .'. Thus, the TGP avowed to be the true opposition party and tried to replace the DPP as the political advocate for all the social movements.

The original core of the TGP came from all sectors of movement, such as the aborigines, education reform activists, and environmentalists. Its first Chairperson was an anti-nuclear veteran, Kao Cheng-yen, Professor of National Taiwan University and a former President of the TEPU. With Kao, many anti-nuclear activists came along and took part in organizational work for the new party. One participant revealed his pent-up grudge against the DPP. He claimed that the DPP rode free with the rising wave of social protests, but did not bring enough feedback to the latter. He insisted, 'We must have our own mass and money.' With this belief, the TGP recruited 13 candidates to take part in the election of National Assembly in March 1996. Being a new challenger, the TGP was thought to pose an alarming threat to the DPP at first. The DPP officials tried to counteract the TGP by asking the voters to concentrate on the DPP in order for the TGP to stay in the social movements.

49 Based on an interview with Chen Man-li, August 13, 1999.
51 Cited from an interview with Hong Yu-cheng, September 2, 1999.
The truth was that the TGP was no more than a paper tiger, electorally speaking. With an average voter share of 2.5% in the districts where the TGP participated, only one of its 13 candidates was successfully elected. The irony was that particular elected National Assemblyman was distantly related to the core TGP and consequently left the party two years later. In the next two years, the TGP continued its attempt in the 1997 election of County Councilors and the 1998 election of Legislators and City Councilors. But the electoral turnout for the party was equally dismal, with an average vote share of 1.1% and 1.8% respectively. Today, there are no TGP elected officials or representatives. Judging from its original intent to outflank the DPP, the case of TGP has been a glaring disappointment so far.

How can we explain the TGP’s failure? It is true that the experiences of green parties all over the world vary widely. Even among those most successful ones, it takes many years to build up its own electoral viability. In Taiwan’s case, we saw a collective effort to reverse the growing dependence on the DPP was itself constrained by the circumstances. Once the DPP could stand on its own feet and become the would-be ruling party, it was extremely difficult to overturn the reliance. Few would dispute the fact that the TGP was a bona fide crusader for the anti-nuclear gospel. But those who doubted that the TGP had what Anthony Downs called ‘reasonable chance of winning’ were legion. Thus, in its initial recruiting, the TGP was unable to persuade the anti-nuclear pathfinders, such as Chang Kuo-lung and Edgar Lin, to jump on the same bandwagon. Despite the fact that the founding Chairperson Kao was on good terms with Chang and Lin, the latter preferred to stay within the DPP.

The battleground of the fourth nuclear power plant, Kongliao, was another piece of evidence. In its three successive election campaigns, the TGP never put forward its own candidate to compete against the DPP in this district, though it championed the anti-nuclear cause more eagerly than other mainstream parties.

From tables 4, it is clear that the Kongliao Village tended to turn out higher rates of vote share for the DPP than in Taipei County as

### Table 4.1
*The DPP's Percentage Rates of Vote Share in Kongliao Village (1986–1998), Multi-Member Elections*

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Rate in Kongliao Village</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>34.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Rate in Taipei County</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)–(2)</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
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### Table 4.2
*The DPP's Percentage Rates of Vote Share in Kongliao Village (1989–2000), Single-Member Elections*

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<tr>
<td>(1) Rate in Kongliao Village</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Rate in Taipei County</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)–(2)</td>
<td>-13.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
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Source: The archives room, The Central Election Committee, Ministry of Interior. The author calculated the figures.

Notes: (1) Regarding the election categories: L for Legislators; NA for National Assemblymen; PA for Provincial Assemblymen; CM for County Magistrate; PG for Provincial Governor; P for President. (2) We discount the elections of functional representative groups before 1989. (3) In the 1991 and 1996 National Assembly elections, the rate in Taipei County refers to the seventh electoral district only. (4) In the 1998 election of Legislators, the rate in Taipei County refers to the third district only.
a whole. Ever since the anti-nuclear mobilization at the grassroots level began in late 1980s, the DPP candidates could always count on this area for steady support. Comparing the two tables, we find the DPP’s margins were greater in the single-member elections than in the multi-member ones. In three County Magistrate elections of 1989, 1993, 1997 and the President election of 2000, the DPP even scored absolute majorities. In the single-member elections, party ideologies and identifications stood out more prominently. Here, the DPP could win the elections by simply pointing to its anti-nuclear party charter. For any newcomer, such as the TGP, the well-entrenched DPP’s position in Kongliao was formidable. Local leaders of the Yenliao SDA might have respected Professor Kao as a committed anti-nuclear campaigner, but when it came to the elections, their votes still fell into the DPP’s pocket. The undiminished local support for the DPP was more than a matter of movement camaraderie. For activists in Kongliao, betting on the DPP was certainly a realistic calculation and an efficient way of pooling the anti-nuclear strength. It is believed, as long as the anti-nuclear clause stays intact, the DPP as a whole would not become a second KMT.

The pattern of party dependence, as it developed over a decade, naturally encouraged an attempt to re-assert movement autonomy. Swimming against the current, the TGP stood little chance of winning. From the former camaraderie of the street protest, the DPP has evolved into an established opposition party, ready to assume the national leadership. Despite successive waves of social protest, the KMT’s backed-up project of a fourth nuclear power plant never stopped. Before the KMT fell from the power in 2000, the government only promised not to build a fifth one before 2020. After more than ten years of struggle, the movement did not approach its goal of abolishing the Kongliao plant closer than it did in 1985. Nevertheless, the failure of the movement in no way hindered the DPP from progress on its way to power—that was certainly the logical outcome of party dependence.

**Conclusion**

In economics, the term ‘dependence’ refers to ‘a situation in which the economy of a certain country is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is sub-
jected,’56 as Dos Santos lucidly defined. Here, in politics, what we mean by ‘party dependence’ is the situation where the fate of a social movement is bound to the electoral performance of a certain political party. Dependence means an unsymmetrical relation between these two social organizations. For the final goal of a nuclear-free Taiwan, the anti-nuclear movement relied on the DPP’s political strength to carry out reform, while the DPP’s choice of strategy was in no way constrained by the former. Here, party dependence is an objective situation, existing regardless of the participants’ will or preference. Once the structure of dependence was consolidated, the forces of circumstance proved mightier than the collective effort to revise it, as we witnessed the weak electoral viability of the TGP.

The making of this dependence, as we saw in the case of Taiwan’s anti-nuclear movement, is historical in nature. First, timing counts. The coincidental rises of political opposition and the movement brought them closer in the struggle against the KMT authoritarianism. First come, first serve. The tangwai/DPP enjoyed the advantage of monopolizing the growing market of anti-nuclear votes. Secondly, the ensuing path is also structured by contingent factors. The KMT’s crackdown was repulsive, while the DPP’s growth trickled down some dividends. Last, once the pattern of dependence is consolidated, it needs more impulse and energy to re-gain movement autonomy.

In this essay, we try to ‘bracket’ the questions regarding the anti-nuclear commitment among the DPP leaders, though such debates often arise in the movement circle. Debating over the ‘true’ intention of politicians is less productive than investigating the formation of a dependent pattern. Besides, there is evidence that the DPP’s long advocacy for reforms is more than an instrument for power. Being a contestant for political power, the DPP naturally sets its own priority and agenda. For the movement zealots, it would not be acceptable to place any tactical consideration over the ultimate aim to abolish nuclear power. Thus, there arises the internecine criticism between movement and party. Till now, the DPP has developed ‘pragmatic’ revisions to its previous policy stands, for example Taiwan independence, but such is not the case in the nuclear issue.

Finally, let’s face the current situation. When the DPP government decided to continue the construction of the controversial nuclear

plant, the shock was certainly great. Before that, it was still dimly projected that the logic of party dependence, once realized, would spell success for the movement claim. This great expectation collapsed under the weight of realpolitik. In the face of overwhelming backlash from opposition parties, Chen Shui-bian could not help but give in. With this concession, gone was any lingering nostalgia for the age of dependence. Here, in Taiwan, as the chapter of democratic transition is closed by a turnover of power, a new era of politics in social movements dawns.