The Transnational Advocacy Network: Framing State-NGO Relations in the Anti-Large Dam Campaign

Nina Leong
Ph.D. Candidate
Institute of Mainland China Studies
National Sun Yat-sen University

Abstract
The success of environmental NGOs and transnational advocacy networks in altering the common understanding of large dams from being previously considered as symbols of economic development and modernity to what are now pictured as structures of destruction with adverse environmental and social impact on the communities where they are built has been noteworthy. The past decade has shown that while there have been many transnationally coordinated anti-large dam campaigns that had successful outcomes, there were, on the other hand, large dam projects that have been pursued in spite of opposition, specifically in developing countries. Though there is substantive support for the role played by transnational advocacy networks in framing issues and influencing politics at certain levels, it is still not clear what makes for a successful outcome. This paper contends that the differing outcomes of transnationally coordinated anti-large dam campaigns owe more to the context and the framing of the issues than the expanse of democratic space in the target state. By showing how issues have been framed in three transnationally coordinated campaigns opposing the construction of large dams in China, India and the Philippines, this paper hopes to contribute to the knowledge of state-NGO relations.

Key Words: non-governmental organization; transnational advocacy network; state-ngo relations; framing; anti-large dam campaign;
Introduction

The past three decades have seen the remarkable proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in various capacities, internationally and domestically. They have become increasingly influential players in local and world politics although the precise role they play in world politics and the extent to which they have an impact on global issues and on the internal functions of the state are still the subject of much debate and discussion as seen in the rapidly increasing literature on NGOs.

Environmental NGOs (ENGOs), in particular, have been building new linkages and political alliances on an unprecedented scale across national boundaries to take joint action in monitoring major development and environment protection projects. These interactions, which are structured in terms of networks, have become a visible political force in a number of transnational arenas. Involving scientists, experts, economic actors, and activists, “distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation,” these networks are called transnational advocacy networks. These advocacy networks are significant since they provide a venue for actors in domestic political and social struggles to elevate their issues to the international arena. According to Keck and Sikkink, a transnational advocacy network is an actor in its own right and provides a framework for considering the impact NGOs might have on international politics by serving as a link between domestic and international NGOs.

A goal of these transnational advocacy networks is to change the behavior of states and international organizations by “framing” issues to make them not only comprehensible to a target audience but also attract attention and encourage action. In order to bring issues to the public agenda, networks frame them in innovative ways, such as creating issues by framing old problems in new ways or transforming other actors’ understanding of their identities and interests. An example of specific concern to this paper is the success of NGOs, in just over a decade, in altering the common understanding of large dams from being previously

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2 Ibid., p.2.
3 “Frames” are described as organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world. For papers and other literature on framing and frame analysis, the works of Erving Goffman, Tuen van Dijk, Serge Moscovici, George Lakoff, Alan Johnson, William Gamson, David Snow, Robert Benford and Paolo Donati have been noteworthy.
4 Keck and Sikkink, pp.2-3.
5 Ibid., p.17.
considered as symbols of economic development and modernity to what are now pictured as structures of destruction with adverse environmental and social impact on the communities where they are built. In the campaign against large dams, transnational advocacy networks created frames that defined the issues at stake and the strategies and tactics that would be employed to cause change in policies of the target state or institution. In certain areas, they not only were able to successfully push for policy changes at both the domestic and international levels through various forms of politics and social pressure but also were able to mobilize the people who were to be displaced by the construction of the dam to engage in protest and other mass actions that dramatically depict their plight and catch the attention of media.

The interactions among governments and NGOs are often far from harmonious as they tend to clash not just in terms of organizational form but also in terms of purpose. The conflict stems from the differing perspectives that are used to view certain issues, or the framing of issues. As claimed by Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, these conflicts cannot be separated from power politics but are rather enmeshed in them. They require analysis of the struggle over meaning. This is why understanding transnational networks or coalitions can not be done unless it is accepted that a significant amount of their activity is directed at changing understandings and interpretations of the actors and issues involved. The frames of reference are different yet these frames are the ones used for persuasive communication aimed at convincing others to take their side. To a large extent, this is what the transnational anti-large dam campaign attempted to do when it urged the World Bank to review its policies with regard to funding dam projects.

The literature on social movements suggests that the prudent choice of frames, and the ability to effectively contest the opposition’s frames, lie at the heart of successful policy advocacy. Most movements are associated with the development of an innovative master frame that either constrains or inspires that movement’s future development. It would seem therefore that the outcome of a campaign, such as the anti-large dam campaign, can depend to a large extent on who frames the issues and how they are framed.

Also of particular interest to this paper is that the transnational anti-large dam campaigns have not been equally effective everywhere. Khagram claims that the anti-dam campaign

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is more likely to succeed where local level and international opposition are able to link up and where resistance takes place in a democratic, institutional context. He attributes the ineffectiveness of a campaign to the lack of democratic space in the target country. Developments indicate that while this contention may have some justification in authoritarian states, such as China, it cannot however account for the unsuccessful transnationally coordinated campaigns in some democratic countries. A case cited in this paper is the now operational San Roque Multi-Purpose Dam in the Philippines, which is a democratic country with a very active NGO sector. Moreover, there continues to be ongoing construction of other large dam projects in several developing countries in Asia, including in India itself where Khagram’s extensive discussion is focused and where the much-publicized Narmada Dam project has been resumed. The Narmada Dam project had gained considerable international attention when the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) was stalled and foreign funding was withdrawn following a transnationally coordinated campaign. It would seem therefore that the successful outcome of the anti-large dam campaign is not contingent on just whether there is sufficient democratic space in a country to be utilized for opposition groups to express their advocacy.

Though there is substantive support for the role played by transnational advocacy networks in framing issues and influencing politics at certain levels, there is still no clear explanation as to the conditions under which these networks can be effective in their campaigns. It would seem that who or what actually determines the outcome of a campaign varies from issue to issue. This paper contends that the differing outcomes of transnationally coordinated anti-large dam campaign owe more to the context and the framing of the issue than the expanse of democratic space in the target state.

In view of the reality that these large dam projects will continue to be a feature of the development path of many developing countries in Asia, there is need to understand the longer term and wider implications of the interaction between the state and NGOs, to include transnational advocacy networks as they pursue their respective goals. The aim of this paper is to show how issue framing may contribute to the understanding of state-NGO relations by examining three transnationally coordinated campaigns opposing the construction of large dams in China, India and the Philippines; specifically, the Three Gorges Dam (TGD) in China, the Narmada Dam Project (NDP) in India and the San Roque Multi-Purpose Dam (SRMPD) in the Philippines. By choosing to focus on these cases, it is to be presumed that the scope of implications drawn with regard to state-NGO relations in this paper is necessarily limited.
Overview of Perspectives on State-NGO Relations

Owing to the differences in the environment wherein they operate, NGOs differ significantly from country to country in terms of state-NGO relationship. They have taken on considerably different features although they emerged due to the existence of similar social needs. In some countries they have virtually become distribution agencies of state resources, while in others they compete with bureaucrats and politicians, attempting to get a larger say in decision-making about resource allocation. In certain areas, the state has co-opted NGOs into the process of administration, while others are outspoken critics of government policies. Even in a single country, NGOs also differ depending on the field of activities they undertake.8 There is a need therefore to interpret NGO activities, including advocacy activities, as efforts to undertake activities in the political or economic realm that are not adequately handled by existing institutions within a state or the state itself. Especially in developing countries, state-NGO relationships need to be analyzed with reference to the political situation as well as the social and economic development of the countries concerned.

There is also the view that the state is an entity which establishes a set of rules that it applies uniformly to all its constituent societies and which it enforces in the name of safeguarding “the public interest.” The state has a “despotic dimension” that includes its authority for regulating private interactions among its members and an “infrastructural dimension” which regulates the formation and management of goods and services that are not produced by private interaction among its citizens.9

Given this understanding, state-NGO relations can be examined in terms of these two dimensions. If attention is focused solely on the “despotic dimension”, analysis of the relationship would be focused on the extent to which and the means by which the state regulates NGOs.10 However, it is the state’s performance with regard to its “infrastructural dimension,” or its ability to provide for equitable distribution of goods and services, that

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9 Ibid., p.8.
determines the areas of activities available to NGOs. The former is referred to as the “political space” for NGOs while the latter dimension is the “economic space.”

Shigetomi analyzes state-NGO relations from this concept of two spaces, economic and political, that are open for NGO activities. The economic space allows NGOs to provide for economic resources that are not properly catered for by any of the existing sectors of society, including the state. A large economic space means that the services of NGOs are in great demand but as the volume of resources supplied by the state, the market or communities grows, the space shrinks. On the hand, political space emerges when the state or community allows NGO activities, which essentially reflects the extent of political control exercised by the state and society over them. The restraints imposed by both the state and communities demarcate the boundaries of political space for NGOs and significantly affect the areas and ways by which they are able to conduct their activities. It has been noted that the existence of an adequate economic space for NGOs does not necessarily imply that NGOs are free to act. In some countries like China and Vietnam, although there may be a large demand for NGO activities, the political environment conducive to free activities of NGOs is absent. It is also important to note that the way and the intensity with which the state imposes political restraints on NGOs vary significantly from country to country. According to Shigetomi, the environment for NGO activities is determined by the combination of the political and economic spaces which exist in a given country. Furthermore, in countries where large economic spaces for NGOs exist but where the state and/or communities are restrictive, NGOs are relatively inactive. The existence, however, of a large latent demand for NGO services in these countries means that any easing of political restraints, even if on a very limited scale, would instantly galvanize their activities.

Asian governments have traditionally interacted and responded to different NGO initiatives in a variety of ways, ranging from benign neglect to facilitation and support to repression. The tendency however has been to rely on co-optation as a means of interacting with NGOs. This may have been facilitated by the fact that most of the NGOs played a service delivery role, supplementary and complementary to governments. Nonetheless, some governments have shown ambivalence toward the expanding role played by NGOs in national development. While some have voiced official support for the expanded role

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11 Shigetomi, pp.8-9.
12 Ibid., pp.8-15.
assumed by the NGOs, they nonetheless increased regulations and controls over these organizations.\textsuperscript{14}

According to Riker, there are five perspectives on how NGOs handle their role in promoting development vis-à-vis the government. First is “autonomous development” which means being independent of the central government. Second is “partners in development” that recognizes the comparative advantage of NGOs and government in addressing certain types of problems that leads to a cooperative relationship. Third is “competitors in development” wherein it is assumed that rivalry exists between government and NGOs, especially at local levels where both attempt to build support bases. Fourth is “NGOs as advocates for government accountability” wherein the NGOs serve as watchdogs of government programs. Fifth is “bypassing the state” which views the state as representing an overwhelming obstacle and NGOs are forced to bypass the state to get to the people.\textsuperscript{15}

Riker also claims that the context within which NGOs operate and the breadth of activity they are allowed are determined by the interaction between the state and the NGOs. This political space is a sensitive, changing environment wherein all actors operate within the parameters set by the state. It is also viewed conceptually as the arena wherein non-state actors may undertake initiatives independently vis-à-vis the state. The boundaries of this space however can contract or expand. Through various means, the state can affect the activities, growth or even abolition of NGOs. Nonetheless, NGOs also have the capability to influence the parameters set by the state. They can bring relevant issues to public attention, advocate certain policies or priorities or push the state to expand the parameters. As NGOs and other groups in the civil sector attempt to expand the political space in which they can organize and operate freely, co-optive governments meanwhile attempt to contract the political space of these non-state actors to limit the activities occurring outside their control. The level of political space will clearly differ within a polity, across geographic regions, among government ministries and within ideological groupings.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p.2.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., pp.23-24.
Based on the concept of Shigetomi of the interaction of political/economic spaces in state-NGO relations, an overview of state-NGO relations in China, India and the Philippines are presented below.\(^{17}\)

**China.** Owing to its authoritarian system, the political space for NGOs in China is small and subjected to many restrictions by the state. But as the country moves toward a market economy, the state has begun to feel the need to allow the establishment of NGOs to supply social services on its behalf, which expands the economic space for NGOs. As a result of a moderate easing of the regulations on NGOs by the government, a number of groups have been established. Although many can be characterized as proxies for state organs, some are called grassroots NGOs, and were established as private sector initiatives. It appears that while the government sees the usefulness of NGOs, it nonetheless intends to keep them under its political control.

**India.** In spite of its democratic political system which allows the free expression of opinions, there are many restrictions on NGOs in India. There is a view that even if NGOs and other voluntary organizations exist in large numbers and undertake a great variety of activities, with some enjoying international recognition, the NGO sector in India is still largely unable to dialogue, as an equal, with the government. Nonetheless, the government continues to rely on NGOs to distribute resources more effectively, especially in support of rural development and poverty-alleviation programs. Seen from the side of NGOs, this continuing inflow of subsidies from the government has become indispensable for their existence. Consequently, a large number of these NGOs have become distribution agents of government resources. In spite of this situation, it is believed that India’s NGOs, with their strong tradition of voluntarism, have the potential of changing the government’s resource distribution system, instead of merely making up for the system’s flaws.

**Philippines.** With poverty at a serious level throughout the country, the Philippines has a vast economic space for NGOs. These organizations made their appearance early on, but for years acted as representatives of existing political forces. However, following the expansion of the political space after the installation of the Aquino administration in 1986, NGOs have grown increasingly independent from existing political organizations, while becoming more deeply involved in political activities of their own. The NGOs’ political activism can be traced in part to the fact there is a widely shared understanding that the state has an important role to play in the distribution of resources. And since there is a tendency for the political elite to appoint its own members to important administrative posts, NGOs

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\(^{17}\) Shigetomi, pp.23-25.
find it imperative to compete with other political forces in order to secure political influence over the decision-making processes in the executive branch.

The Anti-Large Dam Campaign: Politics of Environmental Issues

According to a report by the World Commission on Dams (WCD),\(^\text{18}\) nearly half of the world's rivers have at least one large dam. Dams are built to manage flood waters, harness water as hydropower, supply water to drink or for industry, or to irrigate fields. At present, around one-third of the countries in the world rely on hydropower for more than half of their electricity supply, and large dams generate 19% of electricity overall. Half the world's large dams were built exclusively or primarily for irrigation, and some 30-40% of the 271 million hectares irrigated worldwide rely on dams. Dams have been promoted as an important means of meeting perceived needs for water and energy services and as long-term, strategic investments with the ability to deliver multiple benefits. Some of these additional benefits include regional development, job creation, and generation of income from export earnings, either through direct sales of electricity or by selling cash crops or processed products from electricity-intensive industries. Clearly, dams can play an important role in meeting people's needs.

However, over the last 50 years, attention on large dams was focused not only on their performance but also on their social and environmental impact. They have fragmented and transformed the world's rivers, while global estimates suggest that 40-80 million people have been displaced by reservoirs. With globalization, the basis for decision-making with regard to large dams has become more open, inclusive and transparent in many countries, such that the decision to build a large dam has been one of the most hotly contested issues today, especially with regard to sustainable development. Proponents point to the social and economic development demands that dams are intended to meet, such as irrigation, electricity, flood control and water supply. On the other hand, opponents point to the adverse impacts of dams, such as debt burden, cost overruns, displacement and impoverishment of people, destruction of important ecosystems and environmental resources, and the inequitable sharing of costs and benefits.\(^\text{19}\)


\(^\text{19}\) Ibid.
Driven by research and information on the impact of dams on people, river basins and ecosystems, as well as data on economic performance, the early stage of opposition and controversy focused on specific dams and their impact on the local environment. But gradually these locally driven conflicts began to evolve into a more general and ultimately a global debate about dams. The issues surrounding dams are the same issues that surround water, and how water-related decisions are made, as well as how development effectiveness is assessed. There is little public debate about what kind of dam is to be built but rather the controversy is all related to what the dam will do to river flow and to rights of access to water and river resources, to whether the dam will uproot existing settlements, disrupt the culture and sources of livelihood of local communities, or deplete or degrade environmental resources, or, whether the dam is the best economic investment of public funds and resources. The debate is also partly about what occurred in the past and continues to occur today as well as what may unfold in the future if more dams are built. In some countries, it is driven primarily by specific social or environmental concerns; in others, by broader development considerations.²⁰

Politics is seen as the key mediating mechanism through which human societies can adjust social practices into less environmentally destructive patterns. Lafferty and Meadowcroft claim that while this is not intended to glorify state control or to forget that profound shifts in social activity come about as unplanned consequences of individual or sub-state group decision, it is meant to recognize that politics provides an arena to consider options, to transform perceptions of individual and collective interest, and to manage conflict, as well as a means to modify regulatory frameworks which circumscribe individual and collective action.²¹

According to Hirsch and Warren, the politics of large dams stem primarily “from their role as symbols as well as substance of a development path that imposes large-scale, centralized appropriation of natural resources in the name of wider benefits, but at the unequivocal expense of local people and environments.”²² The discourse on dams is usually focused on power and resistance as well as the inequities that result from uneven distribution of costs and benefits. Issues are framed on topics that include gigantism, local versus

²⁰ Ibid.
national interest and compensation, as well as lost livelihood and heritage, drowned forests and wildlife, and disrupted river systems. The symbolism of dams as markers of national development has been offset by the depiction of dams as Leviathan, in both its material and metaphoric connotations. Campaigns range from opposing dams outright to demands for proper assessment and compensation. The size and influence of individual dam proposals immediately put them at the level of national importance, yet their localization also affects a limited number of identifiable communities. The discourse of environment is used both by opponents of large dams and by their proponents, the latter notably in the global context of greenhouse gases and the need to generate power by means other than fossil fuels.

These discourses with regard to large dams are clearly depicted in the conflicts surrounding the three specific dam projects discussed in this paper: the Three Gorges Dam in China, the Sardar Sarovar Project of the Narmada Dam in India and the San Roque Multi-Purpose Dam in the Philippines. In these three cases, the principal poles in the debate illustrate the range of views on past experience with large dams. One perspective focuses on the gap between the promised benefits of a dam and the actual outcomes. The other view looks at the challenges of water and energy development from a perspective of 'nation-building' and resource allocation. To dam proponents, the answer to any questions about past performance is self-evident, as they maintain that dams have generally performed well as an integral part of water and energy resource development strategies in over 140 nations and, with exceptions, have provided an indispensable range of water and energy services.

On the other hand, opponents contend that better, cheaper, more benign options for meeting water and energy needs exist and have been frequently ignored, from small-scale, decentralized water supply and electricity options to large-scale end-use efficiency and demand-side management options. Dams, it is argued, have often been selected over other options that may meet water or energy goals at lower cost or that may offer development benefits that are more sustainable and more equitable.

One common notable issue in these case studies is the issue of national interest versus local interest. The national governments of India, China and the Philippines all invoked ‘national interest’ as the rationale for pushing through with the construction of the dams in spite of opposition from local and international environmental groups. Issues were framed in the context of national development plans and resource allocation, energy and power planning, as well as industrial growth, employment and modernization.

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The issue of what constitutes national interest is understandably complex, which is further complicated by the issue of control over resources in specific national contexts. According to Hirsch, the “discourse on large resource projects commonly privileges national over parochial local or sectoral interest, but a number of questions are hidden in this discourse of power”. The concern is focused on the issues that lie behind the conflict between national and local interests associated with large resource projects that are allegedly implemented in the name of national development.

In developing countries, the issues of resource development and environment protection may be better viewed from a political-economic perspective. Though most of these countries have acknowledged that environmental concerns are accorded high priority in their national policy agenda, it appears that economic growth and development have been given a much higher priority. This paper contends that in developing countries, the decision to construct large dams involves a decision-making process that is inherently political and the institutional context within which this process is managed helps to determine the extent to which specific social, economic and political interests have greater or lesser control, or influence, over the decisions made. State-NGO relationships therefore need to be viewed with reference to the political situation as well as the social and economic development of the countries concerned. The decision-making process and outcome of large dam projects can serve as an indicator of the extent to which the plurality of interests, inherent in a country’s move toward a diversified market economy, is reflected. As a development choice, large dams often became a focal point for the interests of politicians, dominant and centralized government agencies, international financing agencies and the dam-building industry. Involvement from civil society varies with the degree of debate and open political discourse in the country.

While in all three cases cited in this paper, it can be said that the NGOs involved were part of a larger environmental protection movement, it can also be claimed that their activities had overt political implications. In a general sense, the anti-dam movement in India and the Philippines can be described as more of a social protest against the dominant development paradigm in their respective countries and the inequities resulting from it. And since the state is the planner and executor of that paradigm, then it should be able to make the appropriate changes to the development plan. Over the years, the rhetoric of the anti-dam movement in these countries has become more radical and has expanded to include corruption, human rights violations, poverty and discrimination.

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Viewed from another perspective, there is a positive aspect to this situation. It is that opposition constitutes an important step in strengthening the democratic process in these countries, especially in terms of state-NGO relations and the empowerment of grassroots organizations. To a certain extent, this is also true of the anti-dam movement not just in India and the Philippines but also in China.

**Narmada Dam Project**

Although the Narmada Dam project in India is only one in a long list of local resistance to dams, it stands out ever since it gained prominence as a global symbol of environmental, political and cultural resistance in the mid-eighties. The Narmada Dam project actually refers to the plan for the development of the entire Narmada river basin, which includes 30 major, 135 medium and 3,000 small dams to harness the power and irrigation potential of the basin, or to choke the entire river system, depending on whether you are a supporter or critic of the project. It is claimed that around twenty million people will be displaced by this project. So far, only two dams in this project have been completed, the Tawa and Bargi dams. Two mega dams, the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) and the Indira Sagar Project (ISP) are under construction along with the Mahashwar dam. There are also five other dams that are in various stages of preparation for construction.

The dam was part of a vision of development articulated by India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in the 1940s. The Narmada River flows from the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh and empties into the Arabian Sea after passing through the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. But for various legal and logistical arguments among the affected states, the announcement of the project was delayed until 1979. Of this multi-million dollar project, the SSP is the biggest dam that is to be constructed on the river and is thus the focus of strong opposition from anti-dam advocates.

Projected to generate thousands of megawatts of power, irrigate millions of hectares of land and supply drinking water to hundreds of villages, the Narmada Project is a promise of development for its proponents. If completed, these projects would undoubtedly constitute the largest river basin scheme in India. On the other hand, the project entails submerging

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25 Vinod Raina, “Why People Oppose Dams: Environment and Culture in Subsistence Economies,” in Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Volume 1, Number 1, 2000, ( Routledge), from [http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/chbgugwqxn0m4fxhlbc/ contributions/6/m/m/k/6mmk2yp5e4hxagjb.pdf](http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/chbgugwqxn0m4fxhlbc/contributions/6/m/m/k/6mmk2yp5e4hxagjb.pdf), p.147.

26 Ibid., p.152.

thousands of villages, displacing millions of people, including tribal people, and destroying thousands of hectares of forest lands. Opponents thus charge that the project would be one of the greatest planned social and environmental tragedies in the world.

The Narmada River Project has had a long and conflict-ridden history, starting with more than three decades of political wrangling, investigations and planning at the national, state and ministerial levels before the development project was finally sanctioned.\(^\text{28}\) Politics was a central issue with the SSP ever since it was proposed in 1960 by the state of Gujarat, which envisioned it to serve as a foundation for development in agriculture and industry, and an assertion of Gujarati identity in the region. There was a short-lived but important movement among the farmers of south Gujarat in the late 60s, to pressure the state government to implement the project and not weaken in its resolve since the project was strongly opposed by the government of Madhya Pradesh, which demanded a lower dam in Gujarat, but a higher dam within its own boundaries. This led to inter-state negotiations for a decade until it was referred to the Narmada Waters Disputes Tribunal, which in turn took another decade to give its decision, in 1979.

It is commonly thought that popular agitation around the project started with the formation of the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) in 1985. But the history of struggle in fact began as far back as in 1961, when the Adivasi farmers of villages that were forcibly demolished and removed for the dam and for Kevadia, the township built for the project, agitated for more just compensation than they received. Large farmers and other landowners in the Nimar valley, within Madhya Pradesh, then started protesting their possible displacement from as early as in the late 60s, forming themselves into a Narmada Bachao, Nimar Bachao Samiti and taking their campaign up to the level of the Prime Minister. The issues that are now associated with the Narmada were first articulated by a civil organization in Gujarat, ARCH Vahini, which began working in 1980 in the nineteen Adivasi villages in Gujarat affected by the dam. Some years later, activists from SETU, a civil organization based in Ahmedabad, including Medha Patkar - started organizing work in affected villages in Maharashtra. This later became the Narmada Bachao Andolan, with a mass base in Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Gujarat.

Both ARCH Vahini and the NBA and its supporters initially just wanted rehabilitation for all though the NBA also demanded the right of people affected by the project to have access to information on the project that would affect them. But in the course of their campaign, the NBA also exposed environmental devastation, displacement, and extensive

\(^\text{28}\) Please see articles written by Jai Sen that can be accessed at http://www.narmada.org/articles/JAI_SEN.
violation of human rights in the implementation of the project that led them to claim that full and adequate resettlement of those displaced was not feasible and that the project was not economically viable. They also decried mismanagement and deception of the public by project authorities and the World Bank. In 1992, the Independent Review (or Morse Commission) which had been commissioned by the World Bank vindicated most of their apprehensions and charges. The Commission said that the project could only be completed ‘by unacceptable means’ and recommended that the Bank ‘step back’.29

The movement received fairly extensive support from other Indian movements and from the various sectors in the metropolitan areas of the country. Outside India, it gained support from prominent environmental, human rights, and other civil organizations, especially in North America, Europe, and Japan, as well as by members of Parliaments in several countries. NGOs and other activist groups like Friends of River Narmada, an international coalition of volunteer individuals and organizations provided an extensive support system and solidarity network for the NBA. Through this, the movement's supporters put sustained pressure, especially of public opinion, to bear on their governments to pressure the World Bank, and in turn put similar pressure on the central and state governments in India to meet agreed social and environmental standards. In this same manner, the Bank was eventually forced to withdraw from the project.30

As with the anti-dam campaigns in China and the Philippines, the opposition to the SSP started with the local people who would be displaced by the project demanding proper resettlement compensation. It was brought to an international level, initially because of concern for the destruction of pristine wildlife areas. The concern for the environment, however, was quickly blurred by a concern for the rights of those who would be displaced, especially the tribal people. Once it became clear that the authorities involved would not be able to properly compensate “oustees,” the campaign on the local level became an anti-dam campaign. Eventually, the anti-dam message filtered through to the international campaign.

The targets of the various actors in the campaign differed from the outset. The tribal people and others affected by the proposed construction targeted the national government of India and the three states involved in the project. They also coordinated with national NGOs in India based in New Delhi to help influence both national level ministries and later, the national court system to halt the project. International actors targeted national bilateral aid programs and the World Bank. Each actor in the campaign concentrated on their own political arena, developing dialogues and tactics specific to those arenas. But there were many

29  Ibid.
30  Ibid.
instances where shows of mutual solidarity worked best and thus there were many instances when actors visited political arenas other than their own. The purposes of these visits were either to tell their own stories, as in the case of the tribal people going to Washington, or to better understand the realities and threats at the local level and to provide protection to those who were politically exposed, as was the case when international actors went to the Narmada Valley.31

According to Sen, the type of campaign conducted by the NBA all contributed to the democratization of project planning and implementation, at local, national, and international levels and should be considered as one of the NBA's most important contributions. This was done by forcing the creation of new political space at all levels and the recognition that society and civil actors have a crucial role to play in planning and governance in general.32

The NBA had indeed made significant contributions to the anti-dam campaign. It will be recalled that following the approval of the massive river basin scheme, the World Bank commenced its formal support in 1979, initially for the SSP. This quickly attracted further backing from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Japan and other foreign donors. At that time, the proponents confidently asserted completion of the SSP in less than a decade.

But fifteen years later, construction on the SSP was stalled along with the other projects planned for the Narmada River Valley. Following a transnational campaign involving the NBA with the support of NGOs and allied groups from across India and all over the world, Japan and other funding donors withdrew their support for the projects. The transnational campaign had also led to the World Bank acquiescing to the first ever independent review of a project it was funding. When the review team produced a highly critical report and the Bank was besieged by anti-dam proponents, domestic federal authorities announced in 1993 that the Government of India would forego hundreds of millions of dollars of World Bank funding. Then, in another blow to domestic proponents, India’s Supreme Court ruled to stall construction on the SSP indefinitely.

However, the situation was later reversed. In an interim order in February 1999, the Supreme Court of India gave the go-signal for the dam's height to be raised to 88 meters. This was followed on October 18, 2000 by the judgment of the Supreme Court on the SSP with a two to one majority allowing immediate construction on the dam up to a height of 90 meters. In addition, the Court authorized construction up to the originally planned height of

31 There are numerous literature on the anti-dam activities and interaction of both domestic and foreign NGOs, to include those that can be accessed from http://www.narmada.org.

32 Sen, ibid.
138 meters, in five-meter increments subject to receiving approval from the Relief and Rehabilitation Subgroup of the Narmada Control Authority. Since this judgment was handed down, the Authority had given its approval three times for increasing the height of the dam: in May 2002, an increase of five meters; in March 2004, an increase to 110 meters; and, in March 2006, increase in the height of the dam from 110 to 121 meters.

Three Gorges Dam

As described in a CNN report, the Three Gorges Dam (TGD) is the “virtual definition of a monumental project -- a dam one and a half miles wide and more than 600 feet high that will create a reservoir hundreds of feet deep and nearly 400 miles long.”\textsuperscript{33} The dam is being called the largest construction project in China since the Great Wall with many high-ranking Chinese officials expecting the dam to become a potent symbol of their nation's vitality in this new century. When completed in 2009, the dam is expected to solve some major national problems, primarily, the production of energy for China's growing electrical consumption, with its hydropower turbines capable of providing as much electricity as eighteen nuclear power plants, and taming of the Yangtze River, with its notorious floods that have claimed more than a million lives over the past hundred years. On the other hand, some of the social costs of the project, based on government sources, include the inundation of 632 square kilometers of land, including vast tracts of fertile farmlands and archeological sites, as well as the resettlement of around 1.2 million people.

This project had been under consideration by various leaders in China since the idea of a dam was first proposed in 1919. Chinese engineers however developed preliminary plans for the dam only twenty years later with the assistance of the United States Bureau of Reclamation. It took another ten years, after China’s Communist Revolution, that the project was revived but this time with Soviet technical assistance. After the 1954 floods where around 30,000 people were killed and one million were dislocated, Mao Zedong urged further studies on the project to redesign it from flood-control to a multi-purpose mega-project. Again planning was stalled for various bureaucratic and technical controversies until the 1980s although a five-year technical assistance agreement was signed with the United States in 1981. By 1985, an American Technical Working Group made several recommendations: social and environmental impact studies; a cost-benefit analysis; and, sourcing of finances from bilateral and multilateral agencies like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

\textsuperscript{33} CNN In-depth Special Report ‘China’s Three Gorges Dam’ by Bruce Kennedy, 2001.
The following year, CIDA financed a feasibility study conducted by a Canadian consortium in conjunction with the World Bank. China’s State Planning Commission likewise conducted a parallel study.34

The actual construction of the dam started in 1993 and in June 2003, filling up of the reservoir started. Structural work was also finished in May 2006, nine months ahead of schedule. Several generators have yet to be installed before the dam becomes fully operational in 2009.35

Export credit agencies from eight countries, as well as 26 private banks and the Chinese government, helped finance the dam construction. Several large U.S. investment banks also financed the dam through the underwriting of China Development Bank (CDB) bonds, a government-run development bank that funds infrastructure construction. Approximately 65% of the TGD construction costs are financed by the CDB. However, both the World Bank and the United States' Export-Import Bank did not provide any support for the project, largely because of environmental, economic, and/or transparency concerns.36

The TGD project however has been dogged by controversy both inside and outside China due in large part to the Chinese government’s continuing suppression of dissenting viewpoints on the project including a decades-long tight restriction on public information and debate, extending to actual arrests of political activists opposed to the dam’s construction.

As expected however, Chinese authorities maintain their assurance to their people and the rest of the world that the TGD will be environmentally safe and economically viable, and that it will even contribute toward social stability and prosperity even for the huge number of people who are to be displaced by the dam construction.

Unlike in India and the Philippines, domestic opposition to the TGD project involved mainly individuals rather than organizations. Since 1956, two generations of TGD opponents from Li Rui, formerly Mao Zedong’s personal secretary and a vice-minister of water resources, to Dai Qing, a well-known journalist who in February 1989 published an anthology of articles opposing the dam, have been discriminated against, dismissed from office, publicly humiliated, and even arrested and jailed for their dissenting views. Throughout the protracted debate over the dam, numerous objections and challenges to the project have been mounted by environmentalists, social scientists, geologists, sedimentation experts, hydraulic power

engineers, and other Chinese specialists concerned about the dam’s likely economic, social, political and national security consequences.37

In the face of much domestic and international pressure, the State Council agreed in March 1989 to suspend the construction plans for five years. After the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, however, the government forbade public debate of the dam, accused foreign critics of ignorance or intent to undermine the regime, and imprisoned Dai Qing and other well-known critics.

It was Premier Li Peng who crusaded for the dam and pushed it through the National People’s Congress in April 1992. Despite strenuous government attempts to muzzle the debate however, almost one-third of the normally compliant NPC delegates, in an unprecedented display of legislative dissent, either abstained or cast opposition votes.

After this approval, resettlement soon began and physical preparations for the dam construction started in 1994. While the government solicited technology, services, hardware and financing from abroad, leaders reserved the engineering and construction contracts for Chinese firms. Corruption scandals however have plagued the project. It was believed that contractors had won bids through bribery and then skimmed on equipment and materials to siphon off construction funds. The head of the Three Gorges Economic Development Corporation allegedly sold jobs in his company, took out project-related loans and disappeared with the money in May 2000. Officials from the Three Gorges Resettlement Bureau were caught embezzling funds from resettlement programs in January 2000.38

Much of the project's infrastructure was so shoddy that Premier Zhu Rongji ordered some of it to be demolished in 1999 after a number of high-profile accidents including the collapse of a bridge. Zhu Rongji, who had been a harsh critic of the project, announced that the officials had a "mountain of responsibility on their heads". This was the time that a significant crack had also developed in the dam. To offset construction costs, project officials had quietly changed the operating plan approved by the NPC to fill the reservoir after six years rather than ten. In response, 53 engineers and academics petitioned President Jiang Zemin twice in the first half of 2000 to delay filling the reservoir and relocating the local population until scientists could determine whether a higher reservoir was viable given the sedimentation problems. Construction continued regardless.

Outside China, the chief focus of opposition to the dam is the International Three Gorges Coalition headed by Green China, a group of Chinese students based in the United States. Other members include the Overseas Chinese Ecological Society, Friends of the Earth, and

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37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
the Canadian group, Probe International. Another equally active anti-dam organization is the International Rivers Network (IRN), which also supported the opposition to the SSP in India and the SRMPD in the Philippines.39

**San Roque Multi-Purpose Dam**

The SRMPD in the Philippines is located in the town of San Manuel in the northern province of Pangasinan. It is considered the biggest hydro-electric power plant in Southeast Asia. The construction of the dam was started in May 1998 and commercial operation of the power component began in March 2003 despite controversies and opposition campaigns at the local, national and international levels. Measuring 187 meters high, the dam was constructed for four main objectives: electricity generation of 345 MW, irrigation of 87,000 hectares of land, flood control, and water quality improvement. Power generated from San Roque is channeled to the national grid to provide electrification for the island of Luzon.40

According to the Friends of the Earth – Japan, one of the international NGOs that supported the opposition to the dam, the SRMPD is one of the most controversial projects funded by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). Despite failure to comply with several JBIC policies and Philippine laws, and despite strong opposition from local communities, dam construction was completed and has been operating commercially since March 2003.41

The dam was developed as a Build-Operate-Transfer project, awarded to the San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC), a 100% foreign-owned consortium of Marubeni (Japan) Sithe Philippines (a subsidiary of NY-based Sithe Energies) and the Kansai Electric Company (Japan). Loans for the $1.19 billion project came from the Japanese export credit agency Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and a consortium of Japanese private banks led by the Japan Export and Import Bank (JEXIM).42

It is claimed that construction of the dam affected 20,000 Ibalois, an indigenous tribe in northern Philippines who depend on the Agno River for livelihood. The flooding and sedimentation is anticipated to eventually bury their ancestral lands, including their homes, rice terraces, orchards, pasture lands, gardens and burial grounds. These impacts, acknowledged by project proponents, cannot be mitigated or avoided and thus deprive the

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39 Both Probe International and IRN maintain websites containing running commentaries and reports about the TGD project.
42 Ibid.
Ibalois of their communities and their indigenous culture. More than two thousand five hundred families were also forced to give up their agricultural land and more than three thousand gold-panners lost their livelihood. Most of these people are tenant subsistence farmers who depend on gold-panning, farming, gardening and animal husbandry for their basic needs. These tenant farmers were relocated after the NPC bought the land from the owners. It is claimed that the tenants were made to sign forms in English indicating their agreement to be relocated, even though most of them did not understand English. They were entitled only to cash compensation for their houses, land improvements, and crops and were given no alternative means to restore their livelihoods. As a result, the standard of living of those resettled has deteriorated. Six years after they were moved, many are struggling to survive in resettlement sites and lack sufficient sources of income. Some cannot afford to pay their electricity and water bills and have had to move away again.43

One issue that generated both local and international opposition to the dam construction was the perceived violation of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of the Philippines, which requires the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples for projects that impact their ancestral lands. When the affected Ibalois communities learned of the San Roque Dam project, they immediately raised their concerns with the government about the adverse impacts of this project. In spite of their efforts to defend their rights and appeal to the Philippine government, to JBIC, and to the power companies, through consultations, legal appeals, and petition letters, the project was still pushed through.

Other issues included deficiencies in the Environmental Impact Assessment, inadequate compensation for loss of earnings, faulty resettlement program, lack of consultation with the affected people and violation of human rights.44

On the other hand, to persuade civil society and the local government and then gain political support for the project, the office of the President of the Philippines and JBIC required additional social and environmental standards for the project, particularly addressing indigenous people’s issues. Through these standards, the Philippine government claimed that the SRMPD project consisted of comprehensive, participatory mitigation measures and social development projects for the indigenous communities.

Oppositors to the dam project however claim that despite the elaborate measures, the projects actually escalated corruption and conflict among indigenous communities. Most locals believe that the mitigation measures and the so-called “beneficial” projects have a negative effect on the affected communities.

43  Ibid.
44  Ibid.
The anti-dam opposition campaign has been generally limited to the affected communities and involved various types of protest mass actions, including rallies/demonstrations. Although local and international opposition had been sustained all throughout the construction of the dam, it had never reached the level of controversy as that of the anti-SSP or anti-TGD campaigns. With the Cordillera People’s Alliance serving as the umbrella organizations, local opposition to the dam were sustained by the following community-based organizations: Shalupirip Santahnay Indigenous People’s Movement; Ilogon Inter-Barangay Alliance; Tignay dagiti Mannalon a Mangwayawaya iti Agno (Peasant Movement to Free the Agno); and, the Alyansa dagiti Pesante iti Taeng-Kordilyera (Alliance of Peasants in the Cordillera Homeland).45

Among the international NGOs, the most active supporters of the anti-SRMPD campaign were Friends of the Earth – Japan and the International Rivers Network, USA. These international NGOs launched information drives and sent letter appeals to stop the project to financing institutions in Japan and various government agencies in the Philippines.46

Transnational Advocacy Networks: Impact on State-NGO Relations vis-à-vis the Anti-Dam Campaign

As seen in the case studies presented, the formation of transnational networks by NGOs and other international actors in the area of the environment presented a new mode for international politics. Citizens no longer depend solely on their governments to take the initiative or provide accurate information about issues that affect their lives. NGOs have been able to mount campaigns to protest major hydro-electric dam projects that have reached beyond the grassroots to national and transnational arenas. Where governments have not been responsive to criticism of these projects, NGOs have bypassed the state and lobbied the World Bank and other international donors to reconsider their funding of these projects. As earlier pointed out, the combined advocacy efforts of NGOs in the developing world with allied groups in the West had prompted the World Bank to reexamine and reorient its development policies and programs, especially with regard to dam and resettlement projects.47

It has been cited that it was the transnationally organized campaign waged against the

45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
Narmada Dam Project in India which pressured the World Bank to withdraw its support for the project. The transnational anti-dam advocacy network likewise contributed to the creation of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) in 1997. The WCD is an independent commission mandated to review the development effectiveness of large dams around the world and formulate new global norms for the planning, implementation, operation and decommissioning of these projects.

The case studies also showed that through a “boomerang effect,” domestic actors were able to gain leverage in their own societies against the government by enlisting the aid of non-state actors outside their boundaries to put pressure on the concerned authorities. In essence, there is a triangular relationship involving domestic groups, their governments, and transnational activist networks. According to Keck and Sikkink, activists in transnational networks “try not only to influence policy outcomes, but to transform the terms and nature of the debate.”

They accept though that while these networks may not always be successful in their efforts, they nonetheless have become “increasingly relevant players in policy debates.” This contention is supported in the three case studies presented in this paper where local anti-dam opposition groups were linked up with transnational advocacy networks. It is significant to note however that in spite of their efforts, the construction of the SSP in India is being pushed through while the SRMPD in the Philippines is now operational and the construction of the TGD in China has been completed and is projected to be operational by 2009.

Clearly, while it is possible for transnational networks and environmental campaigns to succeed in effecting change in the policies and procedures of international institutions like the World Bank, they were unable to stop the dam construction, destruction of the environment and or protect the interests of the people affected by the large dams. This is particularly striking in the case of the Narmada Dam Project which is considered as one of the most successful transnationally coordinated anti-dam campaigns.

It would seem that differing interests and priorities of the networks' international, national, and local member groups may have led to divergent preferences for strategies and negotiation points, which in turn weakened the overall impact of their campaign. Particular power constellations within the networks may have led to the determination as to what strategies would be adopted by the movements at particular instances.

48 Ibid.
49 Keck and Sikkink, p.36.
50 Ibid., p.2.
In the three case studies presented, it can be noted that there are issues that are common in the agenda of both foreign and domestic NGOs. To a large extent, the frames of reference of the local groups are more concerned with the economic plight of those affected by the dam construction, such as compensation, resettlement, and livelihood. On the other hand, the issues of foreign NGOs were more focused on global or transnational issues, such as global warming. While it can be said that everyone is concerned with the issue of greenhouse gases, it may be more difficult for developing countries to give it priority if it is perceived that this would mean a reduction of economic development. Both domestic and foreign NGOs support the transnational advocacy campaign against large dams but it would seem that the frame of reference for viewing the issue is different. It appears that this is part of global environmental politics and the differing perspectives of developing and developed countries.

**Conclusion**

From the preceding discussion, it is clear that while the centrality of the state can hardly be overlooked, the role played by NGOs in environmental politics and development has grown. Nonetheless, as illustrated in the three cases presented, economic development as determined by the national government takes higher precedence over environmental protection.

NGOs join networks to achieve specific social change objectives and are aware that it is through collaboration that they are able to drastically increase their political influence. The case studies presented in this paper indicate that transnational advocacy networks certainly help in the internationalization of dam-related issues but the outcome of their campaign is not always decisive.

Transnational networks can exert powerful influence on target states or institutions. Even in an authoritarian regime such as China, NGO collaboration can foster changes in state-NGO interactions. While it is often assumed that NGOs strengthen both state and civil society, it is more apparent that NGO impact is more complex, serving to strengthen the state and/or society in some contexts, but to weaken or undermine them in others.

The conflict over large dams in the cases presented tends to be a symbol of the struggle of the people against the state. While the state invokes “national interest” as the rationale for pursuing large dam construction, the affected people point to the inequities that are involved in the redistribution of resources, namely that some people have to sacrifice for the benefit of others.

The case studies likewise underscore the need for further study of the triangular relationship involving the state, domestic and international NGOs in effecting policy changes
in any society. How issues are framed by these agents presents another option for trying to understand the outcome of their respective campaigns, both in terms of mobilization and political impact.

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